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Introduction 
This essay explores the possibility of a scientific theory of ethics by an examination 
of the writings of John Anderson. Anderson holds the view that the diversity of 
theories in ethics is not because there are a large number of subject matters in 
ethics, but rather that there are a large number of theories attempting to explain 
one set of ethical phenomena.I The ethical field is confused, for the very nature of 
this field is not adequately grasped. The partiality of the resulting views leads to a 
search for 'foundations' that aim to prop up what was never properly constructed 
or realised. Thus Anderson's approach here, as elsewhere, is polemical and 
critical. 
The Object of Ethical Theory 
Anderson's writings on ethics do not provide an ethical theory as such, on the 
contrary his philosophy generally is not of systems that explain everything, rather 
he contends, 
1Birchall, B 
"that philosophy should be systematic. But its systematic 
character should appear in the form of a single logic, not in the 
form of "totality", of a pretended solution of all problems."2 
'Anderson's Positive Ethics', Dialectic, 1969 p 46 
2Anderson, J 'The Place of Hegel in the History of Philosophy' Studies in Empirical 
Philosophy, Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 80 
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He then goes on to add that; 
"It is the business of Dialectic to show that the supposed 
"indemonstrables" and "indefinables" of the sciences are not 
indemonstrable or indefinable, but are subject to investigation. 
Thus all hypotheses implying a division in reality require to be 
"destroyed" (or removed). What this involves is that there is a 
single logic that applies to all sciences, a single way of being 
which all their objects have; we cannot divide reality into higher 
and lower orders, for the difference and the relation between 
them would alike be indefinable and indemonstrable. "3 
Anderson's writings on ethical issues are no exception to this position and most of 
them have been written in response to other philosophers making assertions about 
specific issues. So his actual position on various issues is often obscure and has to 
be read into what is being rebutted, e.g. if he criticises a particular point of view he 
presumably holds the converse. Despite the lack of an explicit ethical theory this 
essay attempts to elaborate Anderson's position in relation to ethics based on his 
writings . 
There is, however, a common thread in Anderson's treatment of the confusion that 
exists in ethical theory and this is the question whether 'good' is a quality or a 
relation. According to Anderson, if there is to be a science of ethics, it must be a 
positive science, therefore, as a first step it is necessary to reject 
"the explanation of natural events by non-natural "powers", 
supposed to lie behind these events and occasion them. What 
3Anderson, J 'Socrates as an Educator' Studies in Empirical Philosophy, Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 212 
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is thus rejected is relativism, i.e., the conception of something 
whose nature it is to have a certain relation ... It is necessary for 
science to reject such conceptions, because if, e.g., we know 
something only as that which caused an event, then we do not 
know what it is itself, and therefore we do not know what 
causes the event or even that anything causes it ........ Extension 
of knowledge is possible ... if we view things naturalistically 
and reject all conceptions of mysterious powers, of ultimates 
and higher realities. This applies as much to ethics as to any 
other science. If there is to be any ethical science, then ethical 
ultimates or powers, moral agencies above the historical facts, 
must be rejected."4 
The Centrality of Moore 
In addressing the issue of whether or not good is a quality or a relation Anderson 
often refers to the work of G E Moore for as he states Moore, 
"has come nearer than any of his predecessors to a positive 
theory [of ethics], not simply by his insistence on the objectivity 
of goodness but by his setting forth of propositions in which it 
is attributed to various "natural" things i.e., by his recognition of 
species of goods.". 5 
By a positive theory Anderson means one which is real, in which talk of good and 
bad is taken for what is intended with descriptions of states of affairs or 
occurrences that can be tested to see if they are true or false; a theory of ethics that 
is not imbued with relativism and 'solves' problems with reference to different 
4Anderson, J 
5Anderson, J 
'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 238 - 9 
'The Nature of Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 268 
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realms of existence and with the re-defining of good in terms of something else . 
In particular, Anderson has no space (or even tolerance) for what to him seems a 
pernicious error - of confusing the quality good with the relationship it enters 
into. This type of thinking leads philosophers and people generally to imagine 
that saying something is good is really just expressing a feeling; calculating the 
costs and benefits of a decision; making a recommendation or brooding over the 
human condition. 6 
The objectivity of goodness is paramount for Anderson, and for its presence to be 
accounted for as such, it is necessary to distinguish between the quality good and 
any relationships it enters into in the contexts of advocacy, calculation or 
expressiveness before it is even possible to develop a science of ethics . 
These are the issues identified by Anderson in his ethical writings and I will 
attempt to analyse the arguments he puts forth and assess whether or not they 
have any relevance for the development of ethical theory today . 
The Realist Approach 
However, before I start on an analysis of Anderson's ethical writings it is essential 
to have some outline of his philosophical framework which will clarify his ideas of 
a positive science of ethics. So the first chapter of this essay will outline the 
6For example Hobbes states " .. whatsoever is the object of any man's Appetite or Desire; that is, 
which part he calleth Good; and the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill" Leviathan, Everyman ed 
Pt 1 Ch 6 p 24 
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aspects of Anderson's philosophical position that impacts on his ethical theory . 
The main aspects covered will include Anderson's theory of propositional reality 
and his realism with reference made to his theory of knowledge and empiricism. 
In the second and third chapters I will outline the position of normative and 
positive ethical systems in relation to relativism; looking at both what he considers 
the confusion of qualities with relations and different realms of existence. Then, 
against this background, I will examine Anderson's ethical writings, in particular 
'The Meaning of Good' which covers his criticism of Moore and the issues of 
'relativism'. Finally I will conclude by assessing whether or not the insights of 
Anderson have anything to offer modem day ethical theory . 
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Chapter One: Realist Philosophy, the Proposition and the Assertor 
Realism, Pluralism and Empiricism 
The main features of Anderson's philosophy that impact on his theory of ethics are 
his theory of propositional reality and his realism that demands such a view. This 
chapter deals with their main features while later chapters elaborate how these 
aspects of Anderson's philosophy generate a positive theory of ethics . 
Developing a positive theory of ethics may seem an impossible task. At first 
glance the project seems flawed. How could anyone be so naive as to imagine that 
ethical predicates describe features in the world like any other statement of facts? 
It seems quite apparent to anyone that statements expressing ethical v~ews cannot \ 
be anything more than the expression of feelings of the person making the 
utterance; at best they may reflect the shared feelings of a number of persons or the 
tribe. Nevertheless according to Anderson, from the position of empirical realism 
a positive theory of ethics is not only feasible, it is obvious, once logical errors have 
been removed . 
Ethics to be a positive science has to have as its focus facts or what is. Goods must 
be goods and not other things - even if certain other things have close causal links 
with goods. This focus is contrary to the position that many moral philosophers 
take in that they regard ethics as a normative science, i.e., about what one ought to 
do or what ought to be . 
6 
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The most outstanding feature of Anderson's philosophy is his empirical realism. 
For him there is no reality other than the complex, and complexly interacting, 
objects of everyday experience7 which are mind independent. This includes the 
independence of the known from the knowing of it. To know something, 
according to Anderson, is to have a relationship with it, however such a 
relationship in no way constitutes the object that is known . 
"[N]o thing or quality of a thing is constituted by the thing's 
relations, .... nothing is constituted by knowing and nothing by 
being known. The notion of "that whose nature it is to know" 
is expressed in the term "consciousness"; that notion of" that 
whose nature it is to be known" in the term "idea". Realism is 
therefore concerned to reject these terms, as involving the 
attempt to take relations as qualities."8 
Realists espouse the view that external objects exist independently of minds and 
although we can 'know' these external objects such knowledge is a relation and 
while it may provide ~owledge of the qualities of an object it is does bring into 
existence those qualities. A relation does not constitute qualities; there is a 
distinct independence between an object and it's being known; being known is a 
relation and not a quality. Moreover, this 'knowing' relationship may be but one 
of several transactions between an individual mind and the objects around it. 
7Passmore, J 
BAnderson, J 
'John Anderson and Twentieth-Century Philosophy' Studies in Empirical 
Philosophy, Angus and Robertson, 1962 p ix 
'The Knower and the Known', Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus 
and Robertson, 1962 p 29 
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In a similar manner Anderson rejects the positions of monism especially that of 
idealism which denies independence to everything but the "Absolute".9 For 
Anderson there are, 
"real differences (as opposed to the idealist doctrine of the 
"merely relative" nature of differences), since otherwise we 
could not distinguish between affirmative and negative 
propositions or indeed make statements at all ...... [T]o recognise 
real differences, or, what comes to the same, different real 
things, is not to say that these things are unrelated. On the 
contrary, any relation has two terms, or holds between different 
things; and if these things are not "really" different, then there 
are not really two terms and there is really no relation."10 
This denial of "constitutive relations" along with idealism allows Anderson to 
assert the existence of mind independent objects which we can "know" directly. 
This position is fundamental to his theory of propositional reality. What is 
known can be stated and propositions are known states of affairs. For Anderson 
experience is the only guide to 'what is the case'. He rejects the notion of the 
transcendental and those special modes of existence that require special modes of 
cognition that ostensibly lead us to an awareness of the transcendental. There 
are no 'ontological truths' that can hover above, underlie or contextualise mere 
facts; facts are all there is. Facts are states of affairs or occurrences in space and 
9Anderson, J 
10ibid p 42 
'Realism and some of its Critics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy, Angus 
and Robertson, 1962 p 42 
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time.11 Knowledge of them is given in propositions. This empiricism of 
Anderson is expressed in the thesis 
"[t]he distinguishing - mark of empiricism as a philosophy is 
that ... .it maintains that there is only one way of being. The 
issue has been confused in the past by reference to knowledge . 
It was quite naturally maintained, by those who postulated 
different ways of being, that in relation to them different ways 
of knowing are required. Hence empiricism has been 
connected, in the history of philosophy, with the view that 
there is only one way of knowing, and particularly that way is 
what was called "sense" in contrast to "reason"; or rather 
differently, that sense is the only originator of knowledge. But 
fundamentally the issue is logical; the dispute is about ways of 
being or of truth, not about ways of knowing truths. It is only 
after it has been assumed that there are other truths than 
matters of fact, or that there are objects which "transcend" 
existence, that a special faculty has to be invented to know 
them."12 
So, for Ariderson there is only one way of being; one kind of truth; and only one 
way of knowing. If it is assumed that there are other truths different from 
matters of fact then the philosopher gets caught in the problem of having to create 
special faculties to 'know' them. We do not have special faculties nor do we have 
any languages other than the language we use to describe everyday experience, 
hence such a situation has us talking about what is 'unspeakable' . 
11 Anderson, J 
12ibid pp 3-4 
'Empiricism' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and Robertson, 1962 
p14 
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Anti-Representationalism 
If there is only one way of being they cannot be degrees of reality. Anderson's 
realism is what is often referred to as naive or direct realism. He rejects the theory 
of representational realism that asserts that it is not possible to have direct 
knowledge of an external object but only an idea or image of it. The problem with 
representational realism is that if all we have access to is an image of an object not 
the object itself then it becomes impossible to ascertain whether or not the idea or 
image is a true representation, therefore it is impossible to access the truth. This 
Anderson finds untenable and he states, 
"[W]ith a representational theory of knowledge it is supposed 
that "our ideas" correspond to a greater or less degree with the 
"external reality" which has produced them in our 
minds ... [Thus] [w]e can only know nature and her parts 
relatively ...... [This] copy theory is completely false, as was 
clearly shown by Berkeley ..... [who] argues that, in order to 
show that "an idea" is a good or bad copy of "an external thing", 
we should have to know them both and compare them - but, of 
course, if we can know external things directly, then the whole 
picture-theory collapses. Actually, this realist line is not the 
one adopted by Berkeley ... [b]ut he has still shown the 
untenability of a representational theory and the only way out 
is to admit a direct knowledge of actual things and to reject the 
whole theory of ideas."13 
Anderson's position of direct realism allows him to assert that we do have direct 
knowledge of external objects and they do exist independently of minds and they 
13Anderson, J 'Marxist Philosophy' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 pp 299-300 
10 
·• 
·• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
are verifiable; therefore it is possible to access the truth.14 Of course we can 
sometimes 'misperceive' or be in error (e.g. the bent oar in the water, the 
diminishing table etc), nevertheless this position of direct realism allows the 
assertion that A causes B and this can be shown to be the case or not to be the case . 
However, the representationalist position does not allow for such verification for 
what is being stated is merely something being perceived as preceding or 
succeeding something else; and nothing is being said about causality.15 
In just the same way when talking of 'good' and 'bad' there is the need to identify 
empirically such 'goods' and 'bads'; and as with anything else that is asserted what 
is asserted could be false. There are no guaranteed truths. This even applies to 
arithmetic or geometry, although it is arguably the case that it is easier to make 
mistakes about some objects rather than others because some objects (such as 
ethical facts) engage our feelings and distort our beliefs more potently than do 
other objects . 
Propositional Reality 
Anderson's logic is a distinctive feature of his philosophy and more particularly 
his theory of propositional reality. For what is has to be asserted otherwise it 
14 Anderson's rejection of representational realism is not, of course, an argument against 
representationalism per ~e but rather against the fact that if you are a representationalist it is 
not possible to talk about things as they really are irrespective of how they are actually 
perceived. For Anderson the position of representationalism prevents him from accessing 
what is and therefore 'the truth'. 
15 Anderson has problems with representationism in relation to causation as well as truth, for if 
something is merely a representation then the fact that A causes B becomes difficult to validate 
and all that can be justifiably claimed is that A is followed by B rather than A causes B. This 
is not unlike Hume's argument against causality in which he argued that we have no justification 
for believing in causality and that we ascribe a 'necessary connection' to events wh'en all that 
we are perceiving is 'constant conjunction' . 
11 
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remains completely unknown; without propositions philosophy becomes no more 
than competing dogmas, for the proposition is the basis of all issues.16 No matter 
what one is arguing for or against, one's view can only ever be in the form of a 
proposition that allows for agreement or disagreement otherwise there will be no 
issue. 
"Any proposition whatever can be denied, i.e. can be conceived 
to be false; .. .if there is anything about which we are uncertain, 
what we are uncertain about is whether or not it is a matter of 
fact; we do not regard it as a matter of "uncertain fact". 
Experience has shown us that we make mistakes, but it could 
not show ~s anything at all unless we sometimes made no 
mistake. Thus the mere possibility of contradiction, the 
general consideration that "we may be wrong", could never 
lead us to give up a particular belief that we held; only a belief 
that other propositions which disprove it, could do so .... [W]hen 
any belief is true, what is believed (the proposition) is 
something that has occurred; when a belief is false, it is still, in 
being believed, supposed to have occurred."17 
It must always be possible to say 'that something is the case' or .'that something is 
not the case', if this cannot be said then there is no proposition or discourse . 
Propositions are states of affairs or actual occurrences stated as such, not 
statements of these states of affairs. There is no 'duplication' of the real as an 
additional level of reality. Most people would unreflectingly believe this to be 
case i.e., its commonsense. On reflection, however, particularly philosophical 
reflection, it is regarded as naive for a statement to be the actual state of affairs . 
16Birchall, B 
17 Anderson, J 
'John Anderson and 'The False Proposition", Dialectic. 1972 p 1 
'The Truth of Propositions' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 21 
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For example, the statement "it is raining in Hobart" is usually regarded, 
philosophically, as a linguistic occurrence, i.e., different from the state of affairs it 
states. However, for Anderson it is the state of affairs and on hearing such an 
utterance, one should be able to "look out the window" and check to see if it is 
true. What Anderson focuses upon is not the occurrence of the utterance, but the 
raining itself; and if on looking out the window it turns out that it is not raining, 
then that too becomes a proposition. Just observing something is not enough to 
disprove a proposition for as soon as any issue is at stake, i.e., a discussion about 
what is true, all that there is are propositions elaborated in arguments . 
The Problem of the False Proposition 
Treating propositions as actual occurrences leads immediately to the problem of 
what to make of propositions that are false. Anderson's view of propositions is 
not a view widely held by philosophers and was repudiated by Moore mainly 
because of this problem of the 'false proposition'. The problem of the false 
proposition is that if you assert, as Anderson does, that a true proposition is not 
just a representation of a true situation but is the true situation itself, then how do 
you account for false propositions? A false proposition would be a false state of 
affairs and this is absurd . 
However a direct realist does not encounter this problem because he does not rule 
out the assertor for he or she is "there" in the situation. The very idea of 'knowing' 
involves a relationship between the proposition and the assertor which allows for 
the possibility of error to exist between the assertor and the proposition. Given 
this position what is stated by the assertor or believer is like a torchlight revealing 
13 
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something. All eyes, as it were, are directed to where the beam of light lands. Of 
course other things remain obscure that are not in the direct 'beam of light' (the 
specific proposition); and argument involves shining the torch (developing the 
relevant syllogisms) on other relevant objects that may be obscured (and of course 
the light and the objects being observed can 'play tricks' on the torchbearer). 
Nevertheless, this position allows the direct realist to claim that not only do you 
have direct knowledge of objects but also that the object perceived is quite distinct 
from you, the perceiver, (i.e. the assertor). As long as what is being revealed 
(stated, brought to light, confirmed) is true, the one doing the asserting remains 
'invisible' . 
However when a mistake happens, the 'presence' of the assertor is announced and 
provides a new object of how - given the conjuncture of objects (which include 
the feelings of the observer) -the mistake occurred. Given this situation it is not 
possible to exclude the assertor and Anderson does not . 
The 'hidden' presence of the Assertor 
Anderson argues that the reason other philosophers have problems with the direct 
realist's concept of propositions (i.e., that a true proposition is not just a 
representation but the true situation itself) is because they regard propositions as 
being comprised of only subjects and predicates. Propositions have to be stated. 
Thus there is always an assertor or believer.18 Therefore, argues Anderson: 
18ct Birchall, B 
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"[t]he question, then, is not of the occurrence of a state of affairs 
with the attribute "falsity" (any.more than of a state of affairs 
characterisable as "not corresponding to reality"); what is meant 
by the occurrence of a "false proposition", is explained by 
reference to the distinction of subject and predicate, as 
someone's mistaking X for Y (taking X to be Y when it is not) - the 
question of this threefold relationship not being one that the 
person who is mistaken intends to raise, and not arising when 
he is not mistaken, when his is presenting the single situation X 
is Y."19 
Propositions, according to Anderson, involve at least a threefold relationship, 
subject, predicate and the assertor.20 These relationships 'happen' in the medium 
of time and space; with space providing location to subjects (i.e., things occupying 
positions in space) and time providing distinction and peculiarity to predicates . 
"Thus to say that things exist in Space and Time [according to 
Anderson] is equivalent to saying that things exist in 
propositional or situational form which, specified further, is to 
say that what the copula conveys is existence in infinite Space 
and Time, while reference to the subject and predicate enables 
us to understand further the joint but differing, roles of Space 
and Time as conditions of existence. In this connection 
Anderson argues that we can regard Space as the form of 
togetherness of things and Time as the form of, their 
distinctness, so that it is as spacial that things can have location 
and be propositional subjects and as temporal that they ean 
19Anderson, J 'Empiricism and Logic' Studies in Empirical Philosophy, Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 170 
20False propositions occur when what is asserted makes the assertor 'present' by virtue of 
revealing a 'mis - take' of something for something else. Error always reveals a shadow of the 
one who has made the 'mis - take'. True propositions make the assertor 'invisible', and so 
philosophers often forget their presence . 
15 
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have distinction or peculiarity and be predicates; that Space 
and Time have these different functions within Space-Time just 
as the subject and the predicate have different functions 
occurring together in the proposition."21 
Although, knowing is a relationship, as long as what is asserted is taken as true, 
the assertor's location in the space remains in the background. When, however, an 
error emerges, all three terms of the triad catch our attention; perhaps the wrong 
part of space is being looked at; perhaps the direction is right but the descriptions 
are wrong or perhaps the view taken is so located as to allow 'tricks' (of whatever) 
to be played upon it. Whatever the focus, more propositions are developed until 
things are back in view correctly. This view of the proposition is part of 
Anderson's fundamental belief in the notion that everything exists in space and 
time in a complex and complexly interacting reality. 
It is tempting within philosophy, particularly the philosophy of this century, to 
make much more out of propositions, for example, their linguistic carriage; the 
presuppositions of experience that enable space and time to be even thought and 
used as reference guides; the operation of logical calculi; all complicate matters. 
Realism has every inclination to explore the complex and criticise simplicities that 
hide it, however, in the case of propositional reality, the complexities have to be 
dealt with in such a way as to not stop the very operation of discourse. 
21saker, A J 
notes on 
Australian Realism: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson, 
Cambridge University Press, 1986 pp 97 - 8. There is very little published 
on Anderson's position regarding Space and Time although he was 
obviously influenced by the work of Samuel Alexander especially his 
book 'Space, Time and Deity'. A J Baker has based his comments on 
Anderson's position on Space and Time on unpublished lecture 
Alexander. 
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Philosophy may indeed eliminate error and restructure our thinking but as with 
the seafaring boat, only a few planks at a time can be fixed; wholesale restructure 
sinks the boat. Thus while Anderson's approach to propositional reality might 
seem stubborn in its refusal to respond to many criticisms, this is in part to be 
accounted for by a disinclination to engage in any elaboration which posits 
dualisms, foundations, or guarantees certainty. Such elaborations are 'discourse 
killing' (ship sinking) activities. The dialectic has to continue unbounded; or to 
return to the torch metaphor, there is only the one torch and it cannot point 
everywhere at once . 
Implications for Ethical Theory 
For Anderson this logic allows him to assert propositions are all that exist and 
these are states of affairs; if it is not possible for a proposition to be denied then it 
is not a genuine proposition. However, this is not to say that all states of affairs 
are propositions even if all propositions are states of affairs. For it is conceivable 
that some states of affairs will never be propositions, although all states of affairs 
are potential propositions . 
This view that all propositions are states of affairs also includes, for Anderson, 
states of affairs of an ethical nature. The difference of ethical states of affairs is a 
material one (subject - predicate) not one of a formal (copula) nature. There are 
ethical subjects and predicates22 and non-ethical subjects and predicates but not 
22For Anderson any term can be a subject or a predicate i.e. the same term can be a predicate in 
one proposition and a subject in another proposition . 
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ethical and non-ethical copulae (this view is consistent with Anderson's view of 
'only way of being').23 
Ethical facts are particularly prone to erroneous formulation because their 
discernment require the assertor to disengage from the very (emotional) 'pull' of 
the objects being talked about. Modern normative ethical theories tend to make a 
virtue out of this lack of disengagement and resign themselves, as will be shown, 
to treating the presence of the assertor as a container of feelings, preferences, 
and/ or anticipations - all at the cost of objectivity. 
These central elements of Anderson's philosophy; propositional reality, the triadic 
nature of propositions and the complexity of relations that interact with the 
knowledge relation are central to a positive view of ethics. 
23Birchall, B 'Anderson's Positive Ethics', Dialectic, 1969 p 47 
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Chapter Two: Relativism: Qualities, Relations and 'Missing Terms' 
Qualities as fundamental 
According to Anderson, the most common logical error made in moral philosophy 
is to confuse relations with qualities. This Anderson calls 'relativism' but it is 
distinct from what is usually called ethical relativism. Ethical relativism is the 
position that there are no universally valid moral principles but rather that all 
moral principles are valid relative to culture, society or individual choice. 
Therefore, whether or not it is right for an individual to act in a certain way 
depends on the society to which they belong.24 Anderson certainly would not 
subscribe to such a view but what he refers to as relativism is not this, but rather is 
the confusion or conflation of qualities with relationships. 
This confusion arises from the belief that in describing a certain relationship of one 
object with another object the description provides knowledge of the object or 
objects. Anderson asserts that this cannot be the case for relationships are not 
qualities; all that is provided is information about the relationship between two 
objects the qualities of the objects are not dependent on this relationship, there are 
no "constitutive relations". For example, in describing someone as a husband all 
that we know is that the person is male and has a wife because what is being 
described is a relationship; it gives us no information about the man . 
24pojman, L P Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, Wadsworth Inc, 1990. p 20 
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Relations, however, presuppose qualities, for in any relation there needs to be at 
least two terms and these terms must be describable. Qualities on the other hand 
do not necessarily presuppose relationships. Anderson believes that the 
confusion of relations with qualities is one of the major problems that prevents the 
development of a science of ethics. In ethics all too often when someone asserts 
that something is good it is difficult to ascertain whether they are expressing 
purely a personal preference which would mean it is not possible to refute them; 
whether they are making a statement of fact which could be refuted or verified; or 
whether they are exhorting someone to do something which they believe 'ought' to 
be done; or some combination of these . 
This confusion that Anderson has identified works in two ways. Insofar as ethical 
discourse states something as good, not only is there a confusion of the quality 
good with the relationship it enters into, but also there is the stating of a line of 
action for people to follow; 
"Ethical realities, then, are concealed, the statement of true 
ethical propositions is hindered, by the confusion of the assertion 
of such propositions with the adoption of policy. The confusion 
works in both directions. When we say that something is good, 
we are supposed to be stating a programme of action for 
ourselves or for others; when we adopt a certain line of action, 
we are supposed to be assuming , or indicating, by example, that 
the line of action is good. In line with this confusion are to be 
found such expressions as the desirable, the serviceable, or the 
justifiable. They are all relativist, in that they imply the 
existence of that whose goodness consists in our pursuing it, or 
saying that it is to be pursued." 25 
25Anderson, J 'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 239 
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which it professes to set forth. In this way logic can be said to 
open the way to observation of the facts by removing the 
metaphysical "blinders"; but it does not itself supply the facts 
which a positive ethics has to consider. These .... are matters of 
observation. "26 
Relativism as Relations hiding qualities 
The consequence of most ethical systems not having a concept of the quality good 
means that they have to fall back onto prescribing what is good through the 
concepts of obligation, duty or ends which, according to Anderson, are 
relationships not qualities. 
"[T]he leading moral theories, up till quite recently, have all had 
such relativist confusions embedded in them. They all assume 
certain higher moral powers whereby historical events can have 
moral characteristics in a secondary sense, just as the 
metaphysician assumes an ultimate reality whereby historical 
appearances can have a subordinate reality and be graciously 
permitted to appear. The relativist conceptions to be 
considered are those of "obligation" and "end". The obligatory 
26Anderson, J 'Logic and Ethics', Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy. 1939 
p59 
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is that which is essentially demanded of us or that whose nature 
it is to command our obedience. The end is that whose nature 
it is to be pursued or which is the goal of striving. 27 
Such concepts as obligation or ends are often difficult to identify as relationships 
for they appear initially to carry qualities in them, but when examined closely 
they reveal they are missing a term. The term, according to Anderson, that they 
are missing is either the fact that they are subscribing to the notion of a higher 
order of reality - the good - or alternatively they are hiding behind another 
authority without naming it. 
"[T]his position of "ethical relativism" is quite widely accepted. 
According to it, we may say, "ethical" statements are 
incomplete; they signify relations one term of which has not 
been stated....... [This] can lead to a great deal of confusion 
when the term "understood" by one party to a discussion is not 
the term "understood" by the other ....... In this way people may 
be led to think that they are in agreement when they are not or 
think they are in agreement when they are not. "28 
The authority is ostensibly disguised but if the position is examined closely what is 
being prescribed has to relate back to some empirical demand by someone. 
Anderson regarded the imperative of obligation as fraudulent as he states, 
27 Anderson, J 
28Anderson, J 
'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 240 
'The Meaning of Good' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 248-9 
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"we should regard "obligation" as signifying not merely a false 
theory of ethics, but also evil motives. Moralism, the doctrine 
of conscience and "moral necessity", exemplifies the natural 
causality of repressing motives. There are acts which are 
performed under a sense of obligation, but what they exhibit is 
not communication but compulsion."29 
Dualism and Monism 
In providing prescriptions on how we ought to live ethical philosophers are 
basically saying that there are two realms of existence or two realities. The reality 
of what 'is', of fact, and a super-ordinate reality of 'ought', that which we are 
required to do. Such a position has the same problems that mind-body dualism 
has. If you determine that there are two existences then it becomes an impassable 
barrier to explain how the two interact without conflating one into the other which 
then logically denies the existence of a dichotomy in the first place . 
John Passmore in his article 'The Two-Worlds Argument' 30develops this argument 
I 
along familiar dualist lines; that if you have two very distinctive qualities that are 
completely separate and distinct from one another then there are serious 
ontological problems to linking them together or attempting to explain how one 
effects the other given there are so distinct and separate. If there are not so 
distinct and separate and they can have an effect on one another then the 
argument that there are so different becomes untenable. Thus, in terms of ethics, 
29Anderson, J 
30passmore, J 
'Determinism and Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy, Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 225 
Philosophical Reasoning, Duckworth, 1 973 (reprinted)pp 
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if the quality good has properties that are so different from the properties of other 
qualities then how can good have an effect on these other qualities; but if the 
quality good does have an effect then the quality good must have the same mode 
of existence as other qualities so there is no special realm of existence . 
Normative ethics has to assume two levels of reality: the reality that one should 
aim for, "the absolute" or the way we ought to live; and a subordinate reality, the 
normal is of everyday life. If the ought is what we should do rather than what 
we do, then when we achieve it, it can no longer be described as the ought but in 
fact becomes what is. If what we do is what is then where does the ought come 
. ? In . 
Another problem that Anderson has with the concept of ought is that it suggests 
that there is a form of conduct that we ought to follow but have no inclination or 
motive to follow; therefore, we are commanded, obliged or told it is our duty to 
follow it. If it is the case that we have no inclination to follow this 'conduct' the 
basis on which we do follow it cannot be in the manner that is required. As 
Anderson states, 
"The spontaneous action of a motive seeking its objective 
cannot be induced by compulsion. Compulsion can only 
induce conformity ...... It may be said, then, that the appeal 
addressed to a person in terms of obligation is either 
unnecessary, since, if he has the appropriate motive it will 
require no external inducement to seek its objective, or useless, 
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since, if he has not the motive, the type of action produced must 
differ from that commanded."31 
In other words if we do have an inclination to behave in the way required then the 
notion of ought is redundant; if we do not have the inclination being appealed to 
by the notion of obligation is not going to achieve the required end either . 
Obligation creates two inaccessible realms of existence 'what is' and 'what ought to 
be' . If the only way of accessing the realm of ought is through the is of existence 
then surely all we are speaking about is the is of existence. If we can talk about 
the realm of the ought without recourse to the realm of is then we have collapsed 
totally into the realm of ought and cannot say anything that is useful about what 
actually is the case, i.e. is. This is the dilemma of normative views of ethics . 
Implications for Ethical Theory 
The dichotomy of the ought and is creates logical problems for the realm of oughts 
has to be a different realm from the realm of is, however, the realm of ought relies 
on the realm of is to be articulated. Anderson, does not accept this notion of 
oughts and is's, and argues that there are no degrees of truth or reality and no 
entities or realms that require a different explanation other than that of ordinary 
truth. This concept of ordinary truth, he believes, also applies also to ethics . 
31 Anderson, J 'Determinism and Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 225 
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For Anderson, and other realists, ethics is concerned with facts. Ethics is not 
simply the analysis of ethical predicates, it is an inquiry into ethical facts which 
may lead us to the conclusion that many conventional ethical judgments are false. 
~~ 
Anderson, claims that ethics, or a science of ethics, is not about questions-of duty 
and obligation or about prescribing, praising or condemning, in other words a 
normative science, but rather a descriptive science which has as its object the study 
of 'goods'. Goods and evils, according to Anderson, are empirical entities along 
with apples and chairs and tables. 
"If there is to be any ethical science, then ethical ultimates or 
powers, moral agencies above historical facts, must be rejected. 
If we are to say significantly that ethics deals with goods, we 
must be able to exhibit goods as going on, as definitely located 
activities, just as we exhibit moving bodies or growing plants. 
This .... may be a difficult undertaking; disinterested inquiry, the 
exact determination of issues, the consideration of just what 
goods are and how they operate, may more easily give way to 
prejudice than in the case of subjects which touch our interests 
less nearly. But it is still possible, and recognition of 
relativism as a foe to science advances the possibility"32 
It is because of this dichotomy that Anderson believes ethics not only can be a 
positive science but it cannot be anything other than a positive science. Ethics is 
about facts or what is rather than what ought to be. 'Goods', according to 
Anderson are natural phenomena that possess certain qualities and can be 
identified as definitively located activities.33 
32Anderson, J 
33Anderson, J 
'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 239 
'The Meaning of Good' Studies in Empirical Philosophy, Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 239 
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Chapter Three: Relativism and Ethical Theories 
Normative vs Positive Theories 
Positive ethical theories presume that it is possible to identify the qualities that the 
things that are good possess whereas normative ethical theories are limited to 
prescribing what should be done. The dominant approaches to ethics in the 
twentieth century tend to be of a normative nature and for the purposes of this 
essay emotivism, prescriptivism and intuitionism will be considered to be 
normative34, along with utilitarianism . 
As indicated above Anderson holds the view that the diversity of approaches in 
ethics are the result of confused apprehensions or illogical treatments of the one, 
positive ethical subject matter. If the confusion is removed then ethical states of 
affairs will be revealed as the really are.35 
"The vital question, [states Anderson] is whether anything but a 
qualitative ethics can give us a coherent view of the facts and 
enable us to see what even confused theories are aiming at. I 
do not think that there can be a coherent view which does not 
recognise a qualitative distinction, similar in the various cases, 
between science and obscurantism, between art and 
philistinism, between the productive and the consumptive 
spirit, between love and hate, between freedom and servility"36 
34These ethical theories presuppose normative or advocative conceptions of ethics even though 
theories like emotivism are considered to be meta-theories. 
35Birchall, B 
36Anderson, J 
'Anderson's Positive Ethics', Dialectic, 1969 p 49 
'The Nature of Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 276 
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With this is mind these current normative ethical theories will be examined to see 
if Anderson's position of the one ethical subject matter can be justified. 
Utilitarianism 
On the surface utilitarianism appears the type of qualitative ethical theory that 
Anderson would support in that it seems to have not only a concept of the quality 
good but also to be objective. Utilitarianism is a relatively simple theory in form 
and focuses on ends with the central concept being that of 'the greatest utility37 for 
the greatest number' . 
However, the concept of utility is not qualitative in that it becomes whatever is 
desired or brings happiness or welfare (whatever is the definition at the time) 
rather than any notion of a descriptive good. Even the most cursory examination 
of this definition shows that it is circular and does not help identify what things 
are good; saying that good is what people desire or prefer only gives us 
information on peoples preferences, that is their feelings about certain objects, it 
does not give us any information about what is good about the object . 
It is obviously possible that what people desire or prefer may not be good or even 
if it is good may not be a 'greater good'. Utilitarianism does not provide any 
way of distinguishing between goods or allowing for priorities. By advocating 
37There are of course numerous interpretations as to what constitutes utility from pleasure to 
happiness, preference utility, welfare utility, etc and this is part of the problem of utilitarianism; 
that although it appears to refer to some notion of objective good it is not a specific term and 
varies not only in the interpretation of the actor but also the theorist. 
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the greatest good or utility for the greatest number utilitarianism slips almost 
unnoticeably into relativism. This slip into relativism is the result of the gaze of 
the utilitarian which is always from somewhere 'above' the marketplace of 
preferences. For example, the mother about to cut up the cake for the children at 
the birthday party might well wish to ponder on how to cut the cake;- evenly; or 
in sizes that suit children's preferences for creamy bits, the icing etc. 
Quantification is always necessary; any administrator would like to be a good 
mother, and have happy clients, who can see that 'there are no favourites' - all 
are treated equally38 . 
While this might provide a calculus for deliberation and a procedure that 
encourages the view of fair-mindedness, it ignores the possibility of an 
administrator free (motherless) arena. Certainly at a birthday party, the children 
might over-extend themselves, get too emotional, upset each other and generally 
make it apparent that they need supervision. But with citizens already engaged 
in a multitude of activities that combine, assist and resist in various combinations, 
utilitarianism appears redundant, unless such activities have been 'subdued' by 
say the State or some other mechanism . 
From a realist position it is appropriate to ask whether such activities might not 
survive without such 'overseeing' and re-produce themselves by virtue of their 
38Qne of the most common criticisms lodged against utilitarianism is its lack of fairness or justice in 
relation to distribution and the fact that despite the many interpretations of utility none appear to 
address this issue adequately; see Winston Nesbitt's article on 'Utilitarianism and benevolence' 
on specifically this issue. Nevertheless, it is usually argued by utilitarians especially when 
referring to the State that utilitarianism does provide a methodology for distribution given its focus 
on the greatest utility for the greatest number. 
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'pull' on participants to 'do their bit' for the cause they represent. This would 
involve goods being seen as being related to the co-operational capacity of 
activities to assist each other. Utilitarianism replaces the empirical inquiry into the 
'colourful' panorama of productive and reproductive social movements with a 
'black and white' freeze-frame of distribution designed to produce maxim utility -
however utility may be defined . 
Anderson was particularly critical of utilitarianism, as exemplified by the State, for 
it puts into practice the relativism he saw as so rife in philosophy. The 'levels of 
reality' become the 'levels of administration'. Vigorous debate and vigorous 
struggles are replaced by a calculus of utilities and a practice of the public bleating 
for recognition, as if the State can 'recognise' anything . 
"[T]hose persons who expect "sufficiency" to be provided for 
them, will find themselves worse off in relying on what the 
State deems sufficient than in making their own organised 
efforts for the provision of the materials they require; they will 
soon find (as indeed they could see already if they wanted to) 
that State provision will be hedged about with all sorts of 
qualifications and restrictions .... [but more importantly] the 
pursuit of security and sufficiency is itself a low aim, that the 
maintenance of a high level of culture depends on the existence 
of a plurality of movements which take their chance in the 
social struggle, instead of having their place and their resources 
assigned to them from a supposedly all-embracing point of 
view."39 
39Anderson, J 'The Servile State' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and Robertson, 
1962 p 334-5 
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Utilitarianism is correct in one respect; ethics is about judgements, but the 
judgements are about activities not individuals or their specific needs. 
Emotivism and the Problem of Feelings 
Emotivists assert that the presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds 
nothing to a moral statement's factual content, in fact, they go even further and say 
that ethical statements cannot be factual statements. For example to say 'you 
stole the money' is a proposition for it can be verified; but to say 'stealing money is 
wrong' does not express a 'proposition which can be either true or false'40. All 
that has been indicated is moral disapproval; the best that such statements can do 
is express emotions in relation to specific behaviours.41 
Anderson completely disagrees with this position asserted by A J Ayer and argues 
that, 
40A J Ayer 
"The suggestion .. that the data of ethics are acts of approval or 
preferences, and that, while it is possible to deal positively with 
the conditions under which we come to approve of this or that, 
there remains the question of the "validity" of our approval, a 
question that cannot be treated in a positive fashion. But 
when we consider what is meant by validity ... [surely] it simply 
means the truth of the judgments we pass .... .In a moral 
judgment, as in any other, something is judged or asserted, i.e., 
some situation is said to have occurred ... It would be absurd to 
say that, although such situations are asserted, ethics cannot 
Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin 1971. 
41For a more sophisticated account see CL Stevenson Ethics and Language . 
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take account of them but must begin with our approval.. .. No 
one but the most recalcitrant relativist would dream of saying 
that the data of physics are "physical judgments", instead of 
physical facts; yet the one view is as reasonable as the 
other ..... If, then, we all pass moral judgments, this means that 
we all suppose that there are moral facts, which naturally, are 
that data of ethics."42 
If Anderson's logic is applied to emotivism we find that the emotivist gives the 
centre stage to the subject of the proposition and its assertor. Predicates become 
merely a backdrop (a staging) for the assertor's feelings to be given the outlet that 
is appropriate. For example, one might be excited by a lecture, moved by its 
insights and genuinely experience emotions of wonder at what has been covered. 
On the emotivist view, one can express this in part by saying "that was a very 
good lecture". To say instead "I was greatly moved/excited/impressed/ by that 
lecture" might seem the same. There a difference, even by emotivist standards. 
The latter formulation is explicitly personal; whereas the former 'ethical' version 
implies that others might well be expected to have felt some of the same reactions 
for it was indeed a 'good lecture' for whosoever is capable of discerning it . 
However, a realist account of ethics, would start by questioning whether, in regard 
to the first assertion, that the lecture was indeed 'good'; in the latter formulation 
whether indeed the person was as moved as was asserted. In both cases mistakes 
can be made - particularly in this area of ethical discourse. In the case of the 
former, attention has to be paid to what is a 'good' lecture. This will involve 
42Anderson, J 'Determinism and Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 216 
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developing a list of qualities that make up good as opposed to bad lectures. In the 
second case, it involves allowing for the fact that the person so moved may not be 
fully aware of their own feelings. One leads to an analysis of an activity -
lecturing; the other to a psychological inquiry. Thus, while it is not denied that 
ethical predicates might reveal feelings, the point of the exercise in using ethical 
predicates as opposed to other sorts of predicates has raised a question that needs 
addressing regarding activities, not just feelings . 
Prescriptivism and the drive to Universalism 
Prescriptivism43 also takes a normative view of moral statements and like 
emotivism focuses on language use and supports the claim that moral statements 
cannot be proven or falsified. But unlike emotivism, prescriptivism claims that 
moral statements are also universal prescriptions, i.e., that they are action guiding 
statements that apply universally and without exception. By asserting that not 
only are moral statements feelings of approval towards certain things, but also, 
that they are universalizable and prescriptive, prescriptivism regards moral 
statements as requiring people to undertake particular courses of action . 
According to the prescriptivist, the prescriptive element in moral judgments is 
divided into two classes, the class of overt imperatives and the class of evaluative 
words or sentences. Words such as 'ought' and 'you should' are considered to 
involve imperatives, whereas words such as 'good' and 'desirable' are evaluative . 
43Anderson has not written anything specifically on prescriptivism, however, given its similarity to 
emotivism I am assuming that he would have been critical of it and argued that it displays similar 
logical confusions to that of emotivism . 
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Ethical statements that are imperative are considered fundamental to prescriptive 
language, for if moral judgments are to be action-guiding they must contain at 
least one imperative. 
Prescriptivism explores the compelling nature of some ethical judgements and 
ethically informed decisions. Insofar as action is to be guided, it is alluring to 
believe that whatever guide is chosen, it will also apply to anyone else who might 
be in the same situation. An ethical stance might be subjectively felt but it also is 
expected to apply to a universal human plane. Personal authenticity appears th,en 
to be linked with advocacy. Such links are worth exploring, but from a realist 
point of view, the issue at hand is the originating quality of the activity or situation 
that brings forth such a universalising drive. What is it about this situation as 
opposed to some other that causes such uncompromising advocacy? This 
redirects attention to 'goods' which, contrary to prescriptivism is not some 
evaluative 'add-on', but the questioning of the very source for any imperative 
statement, (for all commands have to be uttered by someone) . 
Whereas in emotivism the assertor is given 'centr~ stage' (with the real reduced to 
a backdrop), with prescriptivism, the assertor becomes hidden or 'dissolved' 
within the seemingly pure exhortations of categorical imperatives. Raw 
expressions of emotion can be given the refinement of universal injunctions. 
Morality finds a home here; such injunctions are not only universal but they 
become overriding principles of behaviour. While it may appear that the assertor 
is whomsoever is making the statement there is in fact a missing term because it is 
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not clear who is prescribing or who is commanding. Is it the assertor and on 
what basis? 
Intuitivism and the Discernment of Good 
Intuitionists believe that a special capacity is required for the discernment of good. 
This however has problems: who possesses these skills and how do you recognise 
goodness? Furthermore, what are we to say when two person's intuitions 
conflict? At a naive level, intuitivism refers to the deep seated belief that some 
ethical ideas are simply self-evident. From this basis various theorists have sought 
to develop axiologies in which underlying 'universal' intuitions are listed and 
elaborated . 
For example, all societies have prohibitions on murder. There appears to be a 
universal revulsion to murder. From a realist point of view, there are things to be 
discerned that concern goods and evils and these are indeed more provocatively 
available for inspection when dealing with murder. However, just as there is a 
universal revulsion to murder, there are equally strong elaborations of justified 
homicide. Consequently, intuitionism, at least at a naive level, leads nowhere for 
ultimately it is allured by the view that each act is open to ethical scrutiny, but it is 
unable to provide a rationale for why one person may regard an act of killing as 
murder and another as justifiable homicide. Whereas for a realist, acts can only be 
viewed as part of activities and these far exceed acts and actors, for the realist 
·v......., 
would be concerned with establish the facts in relation to all aspects of the 'killing', 
i.e., the context and not just the persons involved . 
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Elements of a Realist Account 
The concept of good as a purely descriptive quality has no place in normative 
ethical theories, (even utilitarianism for although it subscribes to the notion of 
good, good is not a descriptive quality but is socially defined). Such a concept 
does not exist, any reference to good is considered to be, at least partly, evaluative 
and is merely recommending that someone act on whatever is being labelled as 
good. This is because the fundamental position has been given to the "assertor" as 
a consequence of this there is no possibility of error as this has been foreclosed; if 
statements as to what is good and was is not good are regarded as evaluative then 
it is not possible for an assessment as to whether or not they are true to be made; it 
does not make sense. For, although the assertor is making the statements, these 
statements are not regarded as propositions and therefore to question the veracity 
of what is being said is meaningless . 
Anderson argues that although normative ethical theories cannot give an account 
of goods in effect they presuppose the existence of goods insofar as, 
"[t]he use of the term "good" even relativistically for what is 
wanted shows that some recognition was taken to be given to 
goodness; and the antithesis between good and bad, as 
contrasted with that between right and wrong, shows that a 
qualitative distinction was, however vaguely, recognised, and 
not a mere distinction between relations of support and 
opposition .. "44 
44Anderson, J 'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 244 
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However, although normative ethical theories presuppose the notion of goods 
they do not have a concept of goods and are reduced to referring only to the 
relationships that good enters into. This relationship is usually articulated in a 
prescriptive manner that provides us with a morality of how we ought to live 
rather than providing the reasons for why we are commanded that we should act 
in a certain way. 
"The most obstinate confusion obstructing the growth of ethical 
knowledge lies in the assumption that ethics teaches us how to 
live or what to live for, i.e. it instructs us in our duty or in the 
approach to the moral end. It may, indeed, be admitted that, 
having studied ethics, we shall be able to do things that we did 
not do before. But this applies as much to the study of 
mathematics or physics as to the study of ethics; it is a 
consequence of the fact that studying is part of our behaviour 
and influences other parts of our behaviour. It cannot on that 
account be said that what is studied is our behaviour, and that 
mathematics, e.g., instructs us in our mathematical duty and 
shows us how to reach the mathematical end .... Knowing 
mathematical facts, we can do certain things; knowing ethical 
facts we can do certain things. "45 
Anderson then goes on assert that for a positive science of ethics to exist there can 
be no 'such thing' as normative ethics, 
45jbid p 239 
"I hold .... that there is no such thing as a "normative" science, 
and I [have] endeavoured, in examining the particular views of 
Moore, to advance considerations that would support that 
general position. It seems to me that the prevalence of the 
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"normative" view is one main reason why ethics as a science 
has not progressed. 46 
46Anderson, J 'The Meaning of Good' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 268 
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Chapter Four: The Meaning of Good 
Moore's Principia Ethica 
This confusion or conflating of the quality good with the relationship that good 
enters into still besets current moral philosophy and it was this confusion that 
Moore, at the beginning of this century, identified in his major work 'Principia 
Ethica' and that Anderson examines in his article 'The Meaning of Good' when he 
assesses just how far Moore was able to disentangle the quality good or the 
meaning of good from the relationship that it enters into. The special importance 
of Moore's work is that he brings these issues into sharp relief in the field of 
ethics47 by addressing them in 'Principia Ethica' and by making this distinction . 
The position that Moore takes in relation to good is that it must be more than just 
I 
'that which is desired'; good must be desired for its own sake{ This view reflects 
the classical view of ethics as illustrated in Plato's 'Euthyphro' where Socrates 
argues that good cannot be that which is desired by the Gods because this would 
be like saying that which is desired is desired. Good has to be desired by the 
Gods because it is good therefore that which is good cannot be desired in terms of 
that which is desired (if in fact it is desired this is a relation it enters into). This is 
an important distinction and it is this distinction that Moore reintroduces when he 
argues that it is not only possible to speak of goods but to identify them . 
47 Anderson, J 'The Nature of Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 268 
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Moore in 'Principia Ethica' examines the very basis of ethical thought and 
questions the functions of ethical terms and the relation of ethical judgments to 
non-ethical factual statements . Moore states that the reason why moral 
philosophy is so 'muddled' is because the right questions have not been asked and 
these questions are; "what kinds of things ought to exist for their own sakes?"; and 
"what kind of actions ought we to perform? "48 According to Moore, moral 
philosophy has continuously confused the question of discovering things that are 
good with the question of prescribing what people should do to be good . 
Definitional Problems and The Naturalistic Fallacy 
In 'Principia Ethica' Moore begins by arguing that it is not possible to define the 
term 'good'. Moore maintains that 'good' stands for a simple unanalysable non-
natural property or quality which things may have, resembling the concept of the 
colour yellow. This term good is similar to the term 'yellow' in that one can only 
learn its meaning by becoming acquainted with the thing it stands for. We 
cannot have any knowledge of goodness by description.49 
Attempting to analyse 'good' in terms of characteristics that constantly accompany 
things that have the property good is fallacious, states Moore, and he calls the 
fallacy the 'naturalistic fallacy'. Moore then goes on to state that any attempt to 
define the word good or identify it with the object for which the word good stands 
48Moore, GE Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, 1965 p viii 
49see Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description - Problems of 
Philosophy, Chapter V 
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is to commit the 'naturalistic fallacy'. Moore's notion of definition is partly the 
reason why he comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to define good. For 
Moore, there are 'complex' things which can be defined by enumerating those 
characteristics that comprise them, and there are 'simple' things which are the final 
terms themselves and no further descriptions can be given of them. Such 
'simples' are known by direct acquaintance and any attempt to define them further 
is not possible . 
The importance of Moore taking this position and the failure of definition that it 
brings illustrates, for Anderson, precisely the problem that ethics has in defining 
its subject matter. 
"[W]e may argue that one of the main obstacles to the 
development of ethical science has been the difficulty of getting 
formal proof of ethical propositions - and perhaps we should 
add that the difficulty has been increased by acceptance of the 
doctrine that Moore goes on to uphold, that good is 
indefinable. "50 
By asserting that good is a simple, unanalysable, non-natural property Moore is 
making it more difficult to identify the quality good and in fact encourages good 
to be assessed by its relations rather than its qualities. Moore attempts to 
overcome this by stating that an understanding of good is based on intuition, that 
is, that good things are recognisable to everyone who reflects on them. 
However, as Anderson argues, this does not really address the issue, 
50Anderson, J 'The Meaning of Good' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p248 
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"when he [Moore] says of people who explain how the word 
"good" is used ... he is showing that he himself has no clear 
conception of ethics or of goodness. [This] is connected with 
his assertion that good is not a "natural" object, and with his 
consequent description of theories which identify good with 
some natural object as committing the naturalistic fallacy ... For 
we can take as natural having a certain quality, and we can take 
as natural being in a certain relation, but we cannot take as 
natural that in which being in a certain relation and being of a 
certain quality are merged. But this is not because it is "non-
natural"; .. .it is because it is nothing at all. The description of 
good as non-natural, like the description of it as indefinable, is 
a way of avoiding the clearing up of ambiguities in Moore's 
conception of it. "51 
Anderson rejects the view that good is indefinable and argues that although there 
is ambiguity in ethical statements this is because they are often incomplete and 
signify relations which do not state one of the terms. As a consequence of this, 
confusion can arise especially if the term "understood" by one person is not the 
term "understood" by the other.52 
"Thus .. if the unstated term in any person's moral judgment is 
his own feelings, if his attaching a moral predicate to a certain 
subject means that he has certain feelings in relation to that 
subject, it would appear that two persons could never pass 
contradictory moral judgments .... [for] they would be dealing 
with different issues ...... And, indeed, one may doubt whether 
confusion would ever arise if the omitted term were merely the 
feelings of the speaker."53 
51 ibid p 259 - 260 
52ibid p 248 
53ibid p 249 
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However, argues Anderson, once it has been established just what the terms are it 
is then possible to establish what is the case. The fact that ethical statements 
often have unspecified or missing terms means that good tends to be 'elusive' and 
this is part of the problem that assertors have when using the term for it exposes 
them to the (emotional) forces that create error. There is more passion in ethics 
than there is in say, mathematics, and this apparent indefinability of 'good' often 
leads to an error . 
Intrinsic Goods and Goods as Ends 
Moore after determining that good is indefinable then proceeds to argue that some 
things are intrinsically good. However, here again Anderson argues that the 
concept of intrinsic goodness cannot be logically sustained at a realist level. It 
would be like saying about something that is red, that 
54jbid p 253 
"[i]t is red that this, and this alone, should exist" .. The assertions 
"This is good" and "It is good that this should exist" are 
intelligible .. only if we take a relational view of goodness - only 
if they have some such meaning as "This is demanded (or 
commanded) that this should exist". If, on the other hand, we 
regard good as a quality, as characteristic of a thing without 
further reference, then "It is good that this should exist" has no 
meaning". 54 
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The Positive Nature of Goods 
Anderson argues that Moore's failure to recognise good as a quality no different 
from other qualities leads him into the relativism of perceiving goods as ends . 
There are inherent problems in regarding goods as ends, argues Anderson, one of 
them one being the problem of means. For example, if X is perceived to be good 
and Y is the means of getting there then Y is presumed to be good. This position 
however cannot be justified. Means cannot be argued as good because an end is 
considered to be so55. There is, however, a more important problem in the very 
conception of goods as ends. The notion that goods can be ends in themselves 
presents a static view of the world that is by no means borne out by the complexity 
of activities in society and the way they complexly interact. As Anderson states, 
"Moore, in upholding the absolutely desirable or the notion of 
"good as an end", is running together relational and non-
relational notions. He is falling into the sort of confusion that 
he himself refers to as "the naturalistic fallacy", exemplified in 
what he takes as Mill's dual use of "desirable" and again in 
"evolutionary ethics" which at once identifies and distinguishes 
the good and the product of evolution, maintaining that "good" 
means neither more nor less than what evolution produces and 
yet maintaining that the product of evolution is good . 
Certainly, Moore holds that some ends are not good; but he 
cannot distinguish good and bad ends except by their qualities -
in which case their being ends has nothing to do with the 
matter."56 
55Just because certain ends are perceived to be good it would be fallacious to believe that the 
means to achieve such 'good' ends would also be good, for it is quite logical to assume that the 
achievement of 'good' ends could be accomplished by 'evil' means. 
56ibid p 256-7 
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Anderson goes on to argue that this relativism of Moore is borne out by his 
treatment of good as a predicate only, whereas Anderson regards good as being 
both subject and predicate.57 Although, if good is being used relationally, argues 
Anderson, then it cannot stand as a distinct subject, for if it is not operating as a 
thing, but as a indicator of how something stands in relation to something else, 
then it cannot be a subject. 58 
What Moore is actually doing, states Anderson, in perceiving goods as ends is 
treating them as the ultimate object of demand, as that for the sake of which anything 
else is demanded. "59 
"Moore has implicitly defined good as that which is ultimately 
demanded (or desired), but he cannot make this explicit 
without exposing himself to criticism on the score of the 
irreducible multiplicity of demands - and, as already said, he 
has a sense of good as a quality. In fact, in his notion of good 
he amalgamates quality and relation (this being the procedure 
which, in my view, is properly described as "relativism") and so 
cannot give either a relational or a qualitative account of it-
hence its "indefinability"."60 
57 As mentioned earlier for Anderson any term can at different times be both subject and predicate; 
no terms are exclusive or pure subjects or predicates. Subjects and predicates are defined by 
their function in a proposition, i.e., the subject is the region in which the occurrence takes place 
and the predicate is the sort of occurrence it is. 
58ibid p 258 
59ibid p 257 
60ibid p 257 
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According to Anderson, the consequence of Moore being unable to arrive at a clear 
distinction between the quality good and the relationship that it enters into means 
that he has to look elsewhere to support his notion of the good and he does this by 
falling back on the notion of obligation. This move merely gets Moore into the 
very relativism that he was ostensibly trying to avoid . 
Moore contends that making the assertion "I am morally bound to perform this 
action" is logically equivalent to saying "this action will produce the greatest 
possible amount of good in the Universe". But, according to Anderson, such a 
notion of obligation is a form of relativism because what is occurring is that some-
one is being exhorted to perform some action without specifying the authority that 
shelters behind what is being exhorted. This is what Anderson refers to as the 
missing term. The missing term being that who is commanding that something 
be done. By attempting to align good with obligation the concept of good is 
being confused with the concept of ought. This means that instead of good being 
a descriptive quality it is being misunderstood as an obligation . 
Contribution of Moore to a Positive Theory of Ethics 
Although Anderson is critical of Moore he nevertheless believes that Moore's 
ethical position has "contributed to such progress as is possible in ethical science 61 and 
he goes on to state that it is only in Moore that the problems of not identifying the 
quality good as a descriptive quality are really highlighted . 
61 Anderson, J 'The Nature of Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 269 
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"if we take good to be a quality, we must regard normative 
theories, whatever their logical confusions, as having played a 
most important part in these controversies - as having, in their 
erection of an "absolute standard", kept alive the sense of an 
absolute quality. Logical confusion will carry with it empirical 
error, but a real subject will still be adumbrated. Thus though 
it is only Moore that the tension of the opposing strains 
approaches bursting-point ... ,we can find in the generality of 
moralists, though in varying degrees, traces of a positive and 
non-mandatory view." 62 
This "absolute standard" that Anderson refers to is the concept of ought or 
obligation and Moore by having such a concept places the quality good outside the 
world of natural qualities into a different mode of existence, this is further 
compounded by his insistence that good is indefinable . 
The position that good is a special quality outside the usual realm of qualities (an 
' 
"absolute standard") is not unique to Moore,f'as Anderson points out, in moral 
philosophy the concept good is usually regarded as something that is quite 
different from other qualities that can be observed as occurring is space and time . 
Such a position, as indicated earlier, presents real problems when you attempt to 
explain how it is possible to observe such a quality if it has a different mode of 
existence to other qualities and, more to the point, how it can have an effect on 
other observable qualities if it occupies a different realm of existence. 
62jbid p 270 
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The other aspect of moral philosophy that Moore highlights, states Anderson, is 
the possibility of making a distinction between the quality good and exhorting 
someone to behave in a certain way. 
"Progress in ethics and allied studies depends on the rejection 
of "mandatoriness", which can only arbitrarily be attached to 
any line of action .... "[U]ntil .. the recognition of goodness as a 
quality of certain human activities is disentangled from the 
advocacy, discussion will not be materially advanced and ethics 
will remain a free field for any one who thinks he can tell 
people what to do."63 
Indeed, for Anderson should a 'good' need to be recommended or advocated this 
is more likely an indication of its lack than its presence. For where motives are 
provoked by guilt, where sanctions underscore recommendations, where people 
worry about what others think, in all these cases the quality good is absent or at 
least diminished. Where instead social activities and groups invigorate 
participants, where there is spontaneous assistance and the robust expression of 
feelings is encouraged; and outward looking views are shared and new alliances 
formed, then in such cases goods are at work. 
Anderson argues that exhorting people to act in a certain way is not the same as 
identifying the quality good. One is advocacy, the other is a matter of objective 
fact and he goes on to say that, 
63Anderson, J 'The Meaning of Good' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 263 
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"It is in fact a standing obstacle to the acceptance of ethics as a 
positive science that people simply will not be persuaded that, 
when we say "X is good", we are not urging them to promote X 
or to exhibit activities of the character X - that there is no more 
advocacy in our statement than in the statement "X is red". 
When they demand proof of such a statement, what they really 
want us to give them is a reason for supporting X - a reason 
which, of course, could be given only by connecting X with 
something (no matter what its nature might be) which they 
actually support, and thus a reason having nothing to do with 
the qualitative characterisation of things." 64 
Normative systems of ethics, however, not only confuse description with desire 
but they also tend to be authoritarian and use such concepts as duty or moral 
sense to avoid specifying the authority that they are invoking . 
64jbid p 263 
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Chapter Five: Goods as Activities 
Good Objects Support Activities 
For Anderson, good does not require a special mode of existence and hence any 
special mode of knowledge; good does not exit as an end nor is good something 
that exists at some sublime level that we are all meant to strive for. After arguing 
against these positions and discussing Moore's inability to define good, we would 
expect Anderson to give us his own definition of 'good'. However, he does not 
do so, but rather argues that good is an activity that is complex, natural, definitely 
located 65 and can be known through observation. 
"Goods, we may say, are those mental activities, or those social 
activities, which are "free" or enterprising, which exhibit the 
spirit of enterprise ...... ethics penetrates both the psychological 
and the sociological field, but is nevertheless a distinct and 
positive inquiry. And the recognition of a class of things to be 
inquired into is more immediately important than a formal 
definition of good." 66 
These definite activities include such things as love, affection, risk, courage, 
freedom, love of beauty, love of truth. .However, Anderson has not just plucked 
these 'goods' from the air he has identified them as goods because they possess the 
65Anderson, J 
66Anderson, J 
'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 239 
'The Meaning of Good' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 267 
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type of characteristics that he believes all goods possess. For, Anderson 
whatever is good is a form of enterprise and manifests itself in a way that makes it 
identifiable. Goods assist and illuminate whereas what is evil or bad resists, 
thwarts, obscures, opposes, suppresses and represses. On the other hand that 
which is good is productive and capable of being developed in special ways by 
means of communication, co-operation, inquiry and participation. As Anderson 
states, 
"goods support or assist one another, but this is a question not 
of policy (choice) but of causality. The activity of inquiry in 
one mind or group causes the continuance of that activity (or 
some other good activity) in another; by its natural operation it 
removes hindrances and provides materials. It might even be 
said to cause the activity to spring up in anther mind or 
group"67 
Productive Ethics 
In addition to regarding goods as assisting each other Anderson believes goods are 
also productive. In forming this view he is influenced by Sorel's68 theory of 
productivity and the related distinction between productive or ethical goods and 
economic or goods of consumption. Goods of consumption, according to Sorel 
treat all goods as wants' and all actions as interested (as opposed to disinterested). 
Goods of productivity, however, according to Sorel, rely on enterprising, self-help 
activities. The influence of Sorel on Anderson is apparent in his ethical writings 
where he sees good activities requiring "commitment, co-operations and initiative" 
67 Anderson, J 
6Bsorel, G 
'Ethics and Advocacy' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 285 
Reflections on Violence. Collier Books, 1974 
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compared with being "acquisitive, servile and reliant on superiors".69 For 
Anderson the concept of productive or ethical goods 
"leads to the view that production is itself a good; it fulfils the 
conditions [required] .. for investigation, and it also assists and is 
assisted by investigation. Indeed, we find investigation 
flourishing where production is developing, and the assistance 
given by science to production is equally well marked. Similar 
considerations apply to aesthetic creation and appreciation"70 
Therefore, for Anderson goods are observable activities that are productive and 
assisting in that they encourage the production of other goods through 
communication and spontaneity and they thwart that which is bad; this is distinct 
from bads, which Anderson believes, not only thwart goods but also other bads. 
An obvious example of how bads thwart other bads is that of a power struggle; 
essentially power struggles are bad insofar as in their very nature they attempt to 
disenfranchise other people. But irrespective of the purposes of the power 
struggles they can be only one winner so bads thwart each other . 
This view of goods that Anderson is promoting is precisely what Moore would 
describe as the 'naturalistic fallacy' , for Anderson is defining good by identifying 
the characteristics of what is associated with good i.e., communication, 
spontaneity, assistance etc. 
69saker, A J 
70Anderson, J 
Anderson's Social Philosophy: The Social Thought and Political Life of 
Professor John Anderson, Angus & Robertson, 1979 p 67 
'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 245 
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For example, you could say to someone looking for a specific car in a street what 
its qualities are like colour, make, or registration number. Some of these qualities 
or the intersection of qualities can delimit which car is being marked out. But if the 
term 'good' is added, it does not help someone find the car. This aspect makes 
good appear as non-natural. For the point is that it always seems sensible to ask 
'Is X which has characteristics a, b, c, really good?' Hence, its goodness cannot be 
equated with its having characteristics a, b, c . 
On reflection, however, it is not unrelated to such qualities. For to say that a car is 
'good' (or a watch, a parliamentary system, or bank) is to say that the specific case 
being described has many of the qualities that make up what is the generality. To 
take the example of a car, at a definitional level, it might be expected to have at 
least wheels, a method of propulsion, passenger carrying capacity, driving controls 
and a chassis. A car missing any of these, might provoke the genuine question as 
to whether it really is a car after all. When the term good is applied to a car, it 
raises horizons to something higher, not to the minimal requirements but to the 
rounding out of what makes a car more than those minimal requirements: comfort, 
feel, spaciousness, economy, manoeuvrability, etc . 
To talk in this way of an object might appear to be collapsing into some type of 
dualism. However, this is not the case rather it is necessary to make the 
distinction between what is perceived as ordinary properties of a car, i.e., the fact 
that it has four wheels and a chassis from attributes that are a consequence of these 
properties, such as comfort, manoeuvrability etc. In much the same way Peter 
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Geach when discussing the difference of good from other qualities distinguishes 
between the notion of an attributive adjective and a predictive adjective. He 
states, 
"There are familiar examples of what I call attributive 
adjectives. 'Big' and 'small' are attributive; 'x is a big flea' does 
not split up into 'x is a flea' and 'x is big' nor 'x is a small 
elephant' into 'x is an elephant' and 'x is small'; for if these 
analyses were legitimate, a simple argument would show that a 
big flea is a big animal and a small elephant is a small 
animal.. .. On the other hand, in the phrase ' a red book' 'red' is a 
predictive adjective in my sense, although not grammatically 
so, for 'is a red book' logically splits up into 'is a book' and 'is 
red'.71 
For Geach good is an attributive adjective and has a 'descriptive force' despite its 
apparent ambiguity. He argues, 
"there is no one description to which all things called 'good so-
and-so 's' answer; but it does not follow either that 'good' is a 
very ambiguous expression or that calling a thing good is 
something different from describing it; and given the 
descriptive force of 'A", the descriptive force of 'a good A' does 
not depend on people's tastes.72 
For Geach when we use the term good we are actually describing something, 
however, because this description varies from one state of affairs to another we 
71Geach, P 
72ibid p 69 
'Good and Evil', Theories of Ethics, ed Philippa Foot, Oxford University 
Press, 1967 p64 
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have presumed that it is meaningless and merely expressing a feeling. What 
Moore perceived as the non-natural quality of 'goodness' could be taken as the 
attributive nature of the term good which in this context is a shorthand for what is 
in excess of the minimum standard or normal expectations of a particular state of 
affairs; it refers to excellence. Furthermore, such an attribute can be 'intuited' by 
someone who is highly experienced in the field (a motoring editor, an experienced 
owner of many cars, a racing driver etc). A novice might not have the necessary 
judgement . 
Usually we know when we are in a field in which we are novices and these 
instances we are particularly attuned to judgements, given by other people, about 
what is good in these contexts. For example, in the area of the performing arts I 
have very little knowledge of the field and therefore I am limited in assessing 
performances, so I take particular note when someone who is experienced in this 
area makes judgements, especially if I respect their judgement. In these contexts, 
it may well be the case that good is shorthand for a complex constellation of 
qualities which in certain combinations fulfil what is required by the concept of an 
object. Knowing 'good' in this sense helps cultivate judgement . 
Discerning Goods 
One indication that something is awry within the modern descriptions of ethics is 
the view that anyone can make ethical judgements. The idea of competence in this 
area is not well developed. It is understood that children have to develop ethical 
ideas whereby simple notions of good and bad, approval and blame are 
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generalised beyond the orbit of familial dynamics. However beyond that little 
. else is suggested by way of development . 
If the mind is an object among objects, its relations with its surrounds will be 
manifold. In particular it will be 'transacting' with those surrounds in ways that 
might be unconscious and full of feeling. Should these feelings be compelling our 
use of the objects around us they may not engender wider supportive activities . 
For example, driving a car in anger can produce a very bad driving experience all 
the more poignant if the car in question could have offered such comfort, 
composure and reflection. Various human activities teach their participants how 
to handle issues despite underlying feelings. Indeed with appropriate handling 
the object can help release feeling without being distorted or undermined by 
feelings. Such a view relates to Anderson's view of character, that individuals 
need to learn to get 'out of the way' when describing the objects around them, i.e., 
they have to become invisible as assertors because they love seeking truth . 
In all this, it might seem that an ethical theory involves looking for elitist orderings 
within activities that demand the best of people. This is how it might seem to a 
non-realist onlooker. For a realist, there is no overall 'outside view', ethics itself 
is part of one's activity. One can, however, have a special relationship with 
goods; one can promote them and also know them. Consequently it becomes 
possible to investigate not only the goods themselves, but also the relationships 
they develop with other goods or bads. For instance, feminism, the green 
movement, consumerism, economic rationalism are not simply rhetoric, they are 
embodied in a range of activities that given them content, thrust and the prospects 
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of accomplishment, failure, error and collapse. While the 'ideals' might seem 
gloriously exciting in each of their movements, it is an empirical question whether 
they remain goods. They may have 'gone bad' - through an inwardness of view 
that encourages an appeal to 'intuit' the self-evident obviousness of their cause; an 
encouragement of emotive experiences rather than social accomplishments; 
detailed prescriptions that others (non-believers) cannot understand or find 
onerous; utility and political calculations that allow for compromise but also 
enable the believer to be less energetic now that they have an 'outside supporter' . 
In all these tendencies there is an ironic alliance between ethical theories and what, 
on a realist and empirical account, are 'bads' . 
Criticisms of Anderson's Ethics 
Anderson, after writing the article "The Meaning of Good", was accused by AN 
Prior of falling it to the same traps of relativism that he accuses others of doing; 
that Anderson, by specifying certain activities as being good, was in fact guilty of 
a disguised form of prescriptivism. Prior states that Anderson although he is 
arguing for a descriptive good, 
"the descriptive predicates which .. [Anderson] make[s] 
synonymous with "good" are precisely those predicates which 
happen to be "demanded" in the morality which .. [he] 
espouse[ s] "73 
Prior believes that Anderson is merely promoting his own values rather than 
identifying descriptive goods and that what Anderson himself calls good is just a 
variation in usage of the word good . 
73Prior A N 'The Meaning of Good' Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy. 
December 1944 p 171 
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What Prior fails to appreciate (or he may regard it as nonsense) is that when 
Anderson asserts that something is good he believes that this can be verified 
empirically; and he points out, in a rebuttal to Prior, that it is not a matter of 
language use, 
"Linguistic, of course, is one of the main sources of 
contemporary confusion, operating, as it does, as a substitute at 
once for philosophy and for a real theory of language."74 
Anderson does not regard propositions as language use; for him propositions are 
descriptions of what is the case and this can be verified. So when he asserts that 'X 
is good' he is describing a state of affairs which is open to discussion - either it is or 
it is not (or was not, or will no longer be, or whatever). It may as well express his 
feelings about X but only because in part X warrants them. 75 Anderson then goes 
on to argue that when he says X is good he is not making a recommendation 
although he does appreciate that that is how most people would treat it. For 
example, in asserting that human affection is good, Anderson is not asserting that 
human affection ought to be pursued or that it is obligatory to bring it about. On 
the contrary, Anderson argues, that the goods he identifies are not the sort of 
things that we can be obliged to exhorted to pursue so he is not prescribing them. 
Good activities, according to Anderson, are not by nature ends therefore they are 
not the sort of thing that can ordinarily be achieved by being pursued; 'one does 
not come to love, or to be courageous, or to develop a spirit of inquiry, by taking 
74Anderson, J 'Ethics and Advocacy' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 279 
75Anderson's theory of propositional reality . 
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these activities as one's objectives, but rather by 'catching them in the course of 
one's membership of social groups'.76 
It is apparent that there is ambiguity here which some critics77 have sought to 
clarify. If by describing someone or some thing as good is using a shorthand for 
excellence; and if participation in social activities is as much an emotional as 
cognitive accomplishment; then it appears that some form of st~iving is implied by 
calling something good. Participants, when talking to themselves as it were, will 
refer colloquially to goods and evils but when they are talking to others about the 
same objects, this discourse appears to be a form of advocacy . 
If such a distinction is difficult, i.e., if some individuals have weak ethical 
sensibilities, it becomes much easier to talk 'on behalf' of a good than it is to 
investigate it. Consequently, ethical predicates might be seen as attracting people 
keen to moralise and in so doing obscure the very processes being moralised about 
(and their own lack of sensibility). The situation might be akin to the rigour of 
mathematics being continually threatened because numerologists kept inundating 
any mathematical discovery with 'elaborations' which might get an individual 
involved in mathematics but in such a way that they are not only 'out of their 
depth' but a social hindrance to the further development of mathematics . 
Mathematics, however, unlike ethics, has long accomplished a separation between 
76op cit p 287 
77 A D Hope also had a problem with this which he identifies in this article 'The Meaning of Good' 
Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy. June 1943 
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feelings and numbers. Ironically, a positive ethics will tend to be anti-thetical to 
the discourse of moralisms. 
AD Hope also criticises Anderson's analysis of Moore and argues against some of 
the assertions made about Moore. However, he regards Anderson's analysis of 
Moore as a possible interpretation and does not appear to realise that what 
Anderson is proposing rejects a relational view of ethics. As a consequence, 
Hope's criticism does not attack the core of what Anderson is saying, for it 
presupposes that it is still possible to have a relational view of ethics and that all 
Anderson is doing is offering an alternative. But as Anderson states in reply to 
Hope, 
"The essential point is that normative theories amalgamate 
different subjects, but the ruling out of one of them is not a 
solution. And it seems to me that Hope's argument depends 
on the simple assumption of the truth of a relational view. It do 
not think it is true, at any rate, that I gave no reason for 
rejecting such a view of goodness. What sort of reason can be 
given except by pointing to a quality, which is the quality in 
question? And how can one prove that it is the quality in 
question except by showing that it is one of the things that 
recognised moralists have talked about? Of course the critic 
can say that he can detect no such quality, and in that case 
discussion comes to an end, unless one can show that various 
things he says imply that he does recognise such a quality."78 
78Anderson, J 'The Nature of Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 270 
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Conclusion 
When individuals think that goods exits in the same way as all other things exist 
the usual response is scepticism. For if this were the case then there appears no 
need for ethical decision making. A listing of what is good, perhaps compiled by 
the most discerning of ethically astute minds, could produce a catalogue of 
activities that are worthwhile - akin to the way wine connoisseurs provide 
information for a wine club catalogue. This seems absurd because there is such a 
compelling sense of personal decision when it comes to ethics. Whether to ignore 
that someone offered a bribe; whether to denounce a government policy; whether 
to let a smear campaign assist in an election, these and a multitude of other 
dilemmas require decisions by the actors involved. There is something pathetic 
about someone who just followed the rules and something strange if the person so 
doing then says the rules are not rules but empirical assessments of what is good . 
In contemporary society we know we have to make decisions about many things 
that were taken for granted in earlier, less critical epochs. However, this type of 
thinking inevitably encourages the view that there are indeed values to choose 
between and values to choose by. A positive ethics appears to deny scope for 
moral elaboration, personal drama and personal responsibility . 
Nothing could be further from the truth. It is because there are goods and evils 
in the world that ethical elaborations occur within society and by individuals. The 
individual might well experience such activities as an inner dialogue. However, 
the very seriousness of ethical deliberation is itself a sign that it is not to be settled 
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by whim. Real forces are fighting for allegiances. Real decisions rather than on-
looker deliberations, are being called for. 
Anderson's notion of good does not allow for a common good, for such a notion 
presupposes a homogeneous society which Anderson dismisses. Society, for 
Anderson, is composed of social movements fighting for allegiances in which 
individuals participate and produce goods (or evils) . 
"These various goods, moreover, are natural occurrences, along 
with activities or forces opposed to them. Whether goods 
flourish in particular persons or in societies at large depends, 
not on the prescriptions of moralists (which are in any case 
mostly inimical to goodness) but on the interplay of various 
historical forces;"79 
A positive theory of ethics may imply that a catalogue of goods is possible, but it 
also implies that the contents of that list will be continually changing- for goods 
happen in, or make history; and will vary by situation - the local 'field' will affect 
the operation of goods and evils alike. In practical terms, this means that each 
issue has to be dealt with by investigation rather than deliberation, engagement 
rather than escape, communication with others rather than monologues with one's 
self . 
79saker, A J Anderson's Social Philosophy: The Social Thought and Political Life of 
Professor John Anderson, Angus & Robertson, 1979 p 35 
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The causal determinism of the forces involved in goods and the weave of 
intersecting forces results in a myriad of possibilities that requires investigation 
which is empirical, focussed, situational, and resolute. 
"[the] community is a historical force or set of activities .... there 
are relations of support and opposition between any activity 
whatever and others surrounding it; .. .in any society, good and 
bad activities are going on, they will be supported and opposed 
by other existing activities ... The question for ethics is to 
... exhibit the working forces of a specific kind, not to call for 
approval or support for them. "80 
One of the ways goods are kept from being 'exhibited' is that we feel their 'pull' 
and relativist ethics allows us to rework the issues in terms of choices based on 
principles rather than getting on with the striving that is required by the good in 
question . 
Anderson is aware that many will find his view of ethics unacceptable; at the end 
of his article 'The Meaning of Good' he writes, 
"That many people would be unconvinced, by the above outline 
of a view, of the existence of a natural quality, good, is obvious; 
but others may see it as something with which they have long 
being acquainted. It may be seen, too, that certain popular 
"moral" conceptions can be accounted for as approaches to what 
I have taken to be ethical facts - 'that "happiness", e.g., may be 
understood not as the receiving of what we want, so that we 
want no more, but as the continuance of an activity, securing its 
BOAnderson, J 'Realism versus Relativism in Ethics' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 
Angus and Robertson, 1962 p 243 
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materials as it goes along; that "freedom" may be taken not in 
the metaphysical sense of release from causation but as a power 
of devoting oneself to what transcends oneself (a social 
movement or "cause"); that even "duty' may be considered as 
expressing the fact that individuals may fall away from 
movements and be painfully brought back. The vital point is 
the rejection of "good as end", of the notion that goods come 
about by being wanted. This the individualistic or 
"consumer's" view, is the main obstacle to the development of a 
positive science (i.e., a science) of ethics."81 
81 Anderson, J 
••••••• 
'The Meaning of Good' Studies in Empirical Philosophy. Angus and 
Robertson, 1962 p 267 
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